INTRODUCTION
could not conceivably have so damaged Rumsfeld, indicates that some variation may in fact take place. It indicates that US policymakers may enjoy greater access to and potential influence over foreign domestic bargaining arenas than counterparts in other states.
This article uses an innovative application of the media studies 'indexing' hypothesis to suggest that reverberation matters more beyond the United States, and that US leaders enjoy disproportionate access to foreign domestic bargaining games. Indexing arises when journalists attempt to meet their professional commitments to balance and objectivity by reporting the views of political actors in rough proportion to their perceived ability to influence events 4 . Most indexing studies focus on domestic politics 5 . But the same forces should apply when journalists report on events overseas. If they care about balance and objectivity they should 'index' their coverage of international affairs in rough proportion to how powerful they consider statespersons to be. The media in less powerful states should, in other words, pay greater attention to foreign leaders than does the media in more powerful states. In Putnam's terms, weaker states should experience more reverberation than stronger states. Recent research in the US demonstrates that foreign actors can gain access to domestic media and can influence both public opinion and domestic politics 6 . This article builds on these findings by looking beyond the US.
The following analysis investigates variation in reverberation between the United
States and United Kingdom during three recent joint military actions. The first section establishes the theoretical relationship between a state's position in the international power hierarchy, journalistic practices and the impact of reverberation upon the two-level game.
The second section sets up a three-part case study comparing US and UK media coverage of joint military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. It introduces elements of both crosstime and cross-national comparison, while recognising the unusual nature of the US-UK relationship. The third section presents results which suggest that the indexing effect does have an international dimension resulting in different levels of reverberation between states.
Further research will be needed to show if this arises beyond the US-UK case, but in this instance UK newspapers covered US leaders more frequently than US newspapers did UK leaders. The final section highlights how considering the operation of two-level games in states other than the US both improves the theory and highlights a degree of 'boundedness' in US FPA. Putnam quite rightly downplayed reverberation because it is of limited significance in the US. But it takes on much greater significance once we shift our focus to other states, and the variation is important. US leaders are better able to influence foreign domestic bargaining than their counterparts overseas. media, and the access they indirectly provide certain actors to foreign domestic bargaining games.
POWER, PRESS AND POLITICS

International indexing
Lance Bennett introduced the concept of "indexing" to the media studies toolkit. interest in overseas sources. But that is not the only causal mechanism the indexing hypothesis suggests. Power potentially matters, too. Journalists should seek out foreign sources not just to provide balance in times of domestic consensus, but also to reflect foreign leaders' ability to influence events. Two types of influence should matter. Firstly, the influence an actor has over foreign policy decision-making in the journalist's home state.
Secondly, the influence they have over the international system as a whole. Like Putnam,
Hayes and Guardino and Murray focus on policymaking dynamics at work in the United
States. In the US, the key domestic decision-makers are also usually the most influential international actors. But elsewhere that is not the case. In the UK, for example, the Prime The relative significance of these figures appears more clearly in Figure 1 . Here it is apparent that the US press cited US-based actors considerably more frequently than the UK press cited UK-based actors. The UK press, furthermore, cited US sources significantly more frequently than the US press cited UK sources. 9/11. David Cameron's profile is much lower. If the prospect of direct foreign influence over US policymaking, or the question of US audiences' familiarity with foreign actors, proved a defining factor in terms of how much attention the US media paid to foreign sources, we would expect fewer foreign source citations during the Libya conflict than during Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact the opposite was the case. This again likely reflects the Obama administration's preference for leading from behind. US journalists had to cite foreign sources when writing about Libya because US leaders had too little to say. At the same time, it suggests that the differences observed between the US and UK cannot be explained solely on the basis of the media's knowledge of particular leaders, nor with reference to the specific policies discussed. A further possibility is that the US and UK media simply adopt different sourceselection strategies. In order to gauge this possibility, Table 3 presents summary statistics showing the distribution of sources according to functional category. The figures look far more similar than they do for citations by nationality. Government sources featured prominently on both sides of the Atlantic. Across the three conflicts, they comprised 57% e of Times citations on average, and 53.1% f of those in the New York Times. Much of the difference between these two figures is attributable to the US press practice of citing television coverage rather than speaking to officials directly. This practice was either less common or less commonly acknowledged in the UK. NGOs are more prominent in US coverage in large part because the category includes think tanks, and the US has a wider range of such institutions.
RESULTS
Summary statistics
Source nationality
Source category
Elected representatives feature more in UK news coverage because of differences in the structure of the political systems in the two states. The US Congress gave authority for . Britain's parliament gave its consent only the day before the invasion started, hence why 14.5% g of sources in
Times coverage of Iraq were MPs. Generally speaking, then, journalists on opposite sides of the Atlantic appear to employ similar source-selection strategies. Where differences arise in the data they are largely explained by dissimilarities between the two political systems. This suggests in turn that the variation seen in the citation of sources by nationality does not relate to fundamental differences in how US and UK journalists work.
Interacting category and nationality
The results presented thus far suggest that UK and US journalists adopt essentially similar source-selection strategies, driven by their professional desire to demonstrate independence and credibility. In line with the international indexing hypothesis, this common approach leads UK journalists to cite non-UK sources more frequently than US journalists cite non-US sources. We will now take an additional analytical step. Since we are interested primarily in policymakers' ability to influence foreign domestic bargaining games, we need to gauge the interaction between source nationality and category. 
ANALYSIS
These results show strong support for the international indexing hypothesis. This in turn suggests that reverberation can hold greater significance in states other than the United
States. This section considers two related analytical points. Firstly, it looks at whether the results are likely to recur in similar situations, either for future interactions involving the US and UK or, more ambitiously, those comprised of different pairs of states. This speaks to the question of whether the variation observed reflects an aberration or the norm. Secondly, this section considers how the application of the two-level game model in non-US settings might be revised slightly to take these findings into account.
Aberration or norm
Britain's policies towards Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya were hardly its own. It did not act independently. It did not have the capacity to act independently. As Walt suggests, the fact two states work in partnership can affect the levels of penetration between them 53 .
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to believe the dynamics seen in the cases covered by this study should recur when the US and UK interact in future. These findings may also be generalizable to comparable interactions amongst allies. For one thing, the US and UK played a range of different roles with regard to each other and to the international system as a whole across the three conflicts, while the underlying patterns in the data remained the same. prominently. This is indeed what happened. As Table 4 shows, the Times cited US officials more frequently than their UK counterparts during the two week period surrounding the start of the campaign against the Taliban. If the US leads a narrow coalition, as it did when invading Iraq, the UK role should be highlighted while US leaders remain prominent. Again the results in Table 4 bear out this prediction, with UK officials gaining greater coverage while US officials lose out. If the US is drawn somewhat reluctantly into a broad coalition, as it was in taking action in Libya, both US and UK leaders should feature less prominently in UK media coverage. This is because neither will appear as the primary force driving the with US officials' access to the UK domestic arena via the press vastly exceeding that their UK counterparts enjoy. The consistency between the conflicts, despite their differences, is such that we can reasonably infer that similar patterns should occur in future cases. This is not an aberration in terms of how the two-level game works in terms of transatlantic relations, in other words. It is the normal state of affairs.
In terms of the implications of these findings for other states, here the key thing to note is that the driving force behind indexing is power 54 . Power is an attribute of all states.
They differ not in kind, but in degree. We would not expect the relationships among different pairs of states to mirror exactly that between the US and UK, which are particularly interdependent allies and which share a language. But we can make certain projections on the basis of these findings. The first relates back to the study's 'least likely' comparative design.
The power differential between the US and UK is smaller than that between the US and most other states. Since it appears to cause significant variations in terms of the levels of reverberation the two experience, we can project that weaker states than the UK will experience similar or greater levels of US reverberation, all else being equal.
Our second projection is more ambitious and more tentative. Reverberation occurs less frequently in the US than it does in other states because the US is the most powerful player in the international system. Even in the US, however, a degree of international indexing occurs. US journalists think US officials are better placed than officials from any other state to influence world affairs, at least as far as they matter from a US domestic perspective. But they recognize that foreign officials matter on occasion. The US is not unique, in other words. The forces driving foreign source selection in the UK also arise in the US. This implies that the variation reported here between US and UK source selection practices derives from the transatlantic power differential rather than from anything unique to the US-UK context. This in turn implies that international indexing should lead to different levels of reverberation between any unequal pairs of states. The absolute levels will likely be lower, since the US-UK relationship is unusually strong. There will be variation as a result of other factors, including the specific form of interaction in a given issue area, and language barriers. But power differentials should play an underlying role. Whether this is in fact the case is a question for future empirical work.
Implications for the two-level game model
We have seen that Putnam's model downplays the possibility of variation in the levels of reverberation experienced by different states. We have seen how greater reverberation grants foreign leaders direct access to, and so at least potentially influence over, the domestic ratification process. Within the US, where reverberation is at its least significant, there is probably no need to modify Putnam's formulation to grant it greater prominence. But beyond the US we probably should do more to take it into account. 
CONCLUSION
The two-level game model is highly effective in a number of ways. It is a necessary if not sufficient condition for foreign actors to shape the behaviour of a state.
The discrepancies observed in this study mean that the structure of domestic bargaining games can vary according to the distribution of power at the international level. Whether a state faces direct foreign access to, and so potential influence over, its domestic politics, and whether a state can potentially exert a direct influence over foreign domestic politics, appears to depend at least in part on the relative international positions of bargaining states. It is not just the attributes of the players that vary among states, in other words, but potentially also the rules of the domestic ratification game.
In addition to its specific contributions on both the empirical and conceptual sides, this study has shown the value for Foreign Policy Analysis of recognizing that the US occupies a unique position at the pinnacle of the international political order. 
